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Abstract 
Multi-agent games are becoming an increas­
ingly prevalent formalism for the study of 
electronic commerce and auctions. The speed 
at which transactions can take place and 
the growing complexity of electronic market­
places makes the study of computationally 
simple agents an appealing direction. In this 
work, we analyze the behavior of agents that 
incrementally adapt their strategy through 
gradient ascent on expected payoff, in the 
simple setting of two-player, two-action, iter­
ated general-sum games, and present a sur­
prising result. We show that either the agents 
will converge to a Nash equilibrium, or if the 
strategies themselves do not converge, then 
their average payoffs will nevertheless con­
verge to the payoffs of a Nash equilibrium. 
1 Introduction 
It is widely expected that in the near future, software 
agents will act on behalf of humans in many electronic 
marketplaces based on auctions, barter, and other 
forms of trading. This makes multi-agent game the­
ory (Owen, 1995) increasingly relevant to the emerg­
ing electronic economy. There are many different for­
malisms within game theory that model interaction 
between competing agents. Our interest is in iterated 
games, which model situations where a set of agents 
or players repeatedly interact with each other in the 
same game. There is a long and illustrious history 
of research in iterated games, such as the study of 
(and even competitions in) solving iterated prisoner's 
dilemma (Owen, 1995). Of particular interest in iter­
ated games is the possibility of the players adapting 
their strategy based on the history of interaction with 
the other players. 
Many different algorithms for adaptive play in iterated 
games have been proposed and analyzed. For example, 
in fictitious play, each player maintains a model of the 
mixed strategy of the other players based on the em­
pirical play so far, and always plays the best response 
to this model at each iteration (Owen, 1995). While 
it is known that the time averages of the strategies 
played form a Nash equilibrium, the strategies them­
selves do not converge to Nash, nor are the averaged 
payoffs to the players guaranteed to be Nash. Kalai 
and Lehrer (1993) proposed a Bayesian strategy for 
players in a repeated game that requires the players 
to have "informed priors", and showed that under this 
condition play converges to a Nash equilibrium. A se­
ries of recent results has shown that the informed prior 
condition is actually quite restrictive, limiting the ap­
plicability of this result. 
These seminal results implicitly assume that un­
bounded computation is allowed at each step. In con­
trast, we envision a future in which agents may main­
tain complex parametric representations of either their 
own strategy or their opponents, and in which full 
Bayesian updating or computation of best responses 
is computationally intractable. In other words, as in 
the rest of artificial intelligence and machine learning, 
in order to efficiently act in a complex environment, 
agents will adopt both representational and computa­
tional restrictions on their behavior in iterated games 
and other settings (e.g., Papadimitrou and Yannakakis 
(1994) and Freund et al. (1995)). 
Perhaps the most common type of algorithm within 
machine learning are those that proceed by gradient 
ascent or descent (or other local methods) on some ap­
propriate objective function. In this paper we study 
the behavior of players adapting by gradient ascent 
in expected payoff in two-person, two-action, general­
sum iterated games. Thus, here we study a specific and 
very simple adaptive strategy in a setting in which a 
general mixed strategy is easy to represent. Such a 
study is a prerequisite to an understanding of gradi­
ent methods on rich, parametric strategy representa-
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tions. While it is known from the game theory litera­
ture that the strategies computed by gradient ascent 
in two-person iterated games need not converge, we 
present a new and perhaps surprising result here. We 
prove that although the strategies of the two players 
may not always converge, their average payoffs always 
do converge to the expected payoffs of some Nash equi­
librium. Thus, the dynamics of gradient ascent ensure 
that the average payoffs to two players adopting this 
simple strategy is the same as the payoff they would 
achieve by adopting arbitrarily complex strategies. 
In the remaining sections, we define our problem and 
the gradient ascent algorithm, and show that the be­
havior of players adapting via gradient ascent can be 
modeled as an affine dynamical system. Many prop­
erties of this dynamical system are known from con­
trol theory literature, and have been applied before to 
the somewhat different setting of evolutionary game 
theory (Weibull, 1997). Our main technical contribu­
tion is a new and detailed geometric analysis of these 
dynamics in the setting of classical game theory, and 
particularly of the effects of the boundary conditions 
imposed by game theory on those dynamics (in con­
trast, evolutionary game theory explicitly and artifi­
cially prevents the dynamics from reaching the bound­
aries). 
2 Problem Definition and Notation 
A two-player, two-action, general-sum game is defined 
by a pair of matrices 
R = [ ru r12 ] and C = [en c12 ] 
r21 r22 c21 c22 
specifying the payoffs for the row player (player 1) and 
the column player (player 2), respectively. If the row 
player chooses action i E {1, 2} and the column player 
chooses action j E {1,2} the payoff to the row player 
is r ij and the payoff to the column player is Cij. Two 
cases of special interest are that of zero-sum games, in 
which the payoff of the column player and the payoff 
of the row player always sums to zero (rij + Cij = 0 
for i,j E {1,2}), and that of team games, in which 
both players always get the same payoff (rij = Cij for 
i,j E {1,2}) . 
The players can choose actions stochastically, in which 
case they are said to be following a mixed strategy. Let 
0 < a < 1 denote the probability of the row player 
piding -;.ction 1 and let 0 � ,B � 1 denote the prob­
ability of the column player picking action 1. Then 
Vr(a,,B), the value or expected payoff of the strategy 
pair (a, ,B) to the row player, is 
Vr(a,,B) = r11(a,B) + r22((1- a)(1- ,B)) 
+r12(a(1- ,B))+ r21((1- a),B) (1) 
and Vc (a, ,B), the value of the strategy pair (a, ,B) to 
the column player, is 
c11(a,B) + c22((1- a)(1- ,B)) 
+c12(a(l- ,B))+ c21((l- a),B). (2) 
The strategy pair (a, ,B) is said to be a Nash equilib­
rium (or Nash pair) if (i) for any mixed strategy a', 
Vr(a',,B) � Vr(a,,B), and (ii) for any mixed strategy 
,8', Vc(a, ,8') � Vc(a, ,B). In other words, as long as 
one player plays their half of the Nash pair, the other 
player has no incentive to change their half of the Nash 
pair. It is well-known that every game has at least one 
Nash pair in the space of mixed (but not necessarily 
pure) strategies. 
3 Gradient Ascent for Iterated Games 
One can view the strategy pair (a, ,B) as a point in JR2 
constrained to lie in the unit square. The functions 
Vr(a, ,B) and Vc(a, ,B) then define two value surfaces 
over the unit square for the row and column players 
respectively. For any given strategy pair, (a, ,B), one 
can compute a gradient for the row player from the 
Vr-value surface and for the column player from the 
Vc-value surface as follows. Letting u = (ru + r22) -
(r21 + r12) and let u' = (cu + c22)- (c21 + c12)), we 
have 
avr�:, ,B) = ,Bu- (r22 - r12) (3) 
(4) 
In the gradient ascent algorithm, each player repeat­
edly adjusts their half of the current strategy pair in 
the direction of their current gradient with some step 
size ry: 
(5) 
where (a0,,80) is an arbitrary starting strategy pair. 
Points on the boundary of the unit square (where at 
least one of a and ,8 is zero or one) have to be handled 
in a special manner, because the gradient may lead the 
players to an infeasible point outside the unit square. 
Therefore, for points on the boundary for which the 
gradient points outside the unit square, we redefine the 
gradient to be the projection of the true gradient onto 
the boundary. For ease of exposition, we do not change 
the notation in Equation 5 to reflect the projection of 
the gradient at the boundary, but the behavior there 
should be understood and is important to our analysis. 
Note that the gradient ascent algorithm assumes a full 
information game - that is, both players know both 
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game matrices, and can see the mixed strategy of their 
opponent at the previous step. (However, if only the 
actual previous move played is visible, we can define a 
stochastic gradient ascent algorithm.) 
4 Gradient Ascent as Affine 
Dynamical System 
If the row and column players were to play according 
to the gradient ascent algorithm of Equation 5, they 
would at iteration k play the strategy pair ( ak, fJk), 
and receive expected payoffs Vr(ak,fJk) and Vc(ak,fJk) 
respectively. We are interested in the performance of 
the two players over time. In particular, we are inter­
ested in what happens to the strategy pair and payoff 
sequences over time. It is well-known in game theory 
that the strategy pair sequence produced by following a 
gradient ascent algorithm may never converge (Owen, 
1995). In this paper we prove that the average payoff 
of both players always converges to that of some Nash 
pair, regardless of whether the strategy pair sequence 
itself converges or not. Note that this also means that 
if the strategy pair sequence does converge, it must 
converge to a Nash pair. 
For the purposes of analysis, it is convenient to first 
consider the gradient ascent algorithm for the limiting 
case of infinitesimal step size (lim11__.o); hereafter we 
will refer to this as the IGA (for Infinitesimal Gradient 
Ascent) algorithm. Subsequently we will show that the 
asymptotic convergence properties of IGA also hold 
in the more practical case of gradient ascent with de­
creasing finite step size. In IGA, the sequence of strat­
egy pairs becomes a continuous trajectory in the unit 
square (though there are discontinuities at the bound­
aries of the unit square because of the projected gra­
dient). The basic intuition behind our analysis comes 
from viewing the two players behaving according to 
IGA as a dynamical system in JR2• In particular, as 
we show below the dynamics of the strategy pair tra­
jectory is that of an affine dynamical system. This 
view does not take into account the constraint that the 
strategy pair has to lie in the unit square. This sep­
aration between the unconstrained dynamics and the 
constraints of the unit square will be useful throughout 
the rest of this paper. 
Using Equations 3,4 and 5 and an infinitesimal step 
size, it is easy to show that the unconstrained dynam­
ics of the strategy pair as a function of time is defined 
by the following differential equation: 
u ] [a ] + [-(r22- r12) ] . (6) 0 {3 -(c22- c21) 
We denote the off-diagonal matrix containing the 
terms u and u' in Equation 6 as U. 
a) b) 
Figure 1: The general form of the dynamics: a) when U 
has imaginary eigenvalues and b) when U has real eigen­
values. 
From dynamical systems theory (Reinhard, 1987), it 
is known that if the matrix U is invertible (we handle 
the non-invertible case separately below), the uncon­
strained strategy pair trajectories can only take the 
two possible qualitative forms shown in Figure 1. No­
tice that these two dynamics are very different: the one 
in Figure 1a has a limit-cycle behavior, while the one in 
Figure 1b is divergent. Now depending on the exact 
values of u and u', the ellipses in Figure 1a can be­
come narrower or wider, or even reverse the direction 
of the flow. Similarly, the angle between the dashed 
axes in Figure 1 b and the direction of flow along the 
axes will depend on u and u'. But these are the two 
general forms of unconstrained dynamics that are pos­
sible. In the next section we define the characteristics 
of general-sum games that determine whether the un­
constrained dynamics is elliptical or divergent. 
The center where the axes of the ellipses meet, or 
where the dashed-axes of the divergent dynamics meet, 
is the point at which the true gradient is zero. By set­
ting the left hand side of Equation 6 to zero and solving 
for the unique center (a*, {3*), we get: 
(a*,{J*) 
[(c22- c21) , (r22-
r12) ] 
u' u 
(7) 
Note that the center is in general not at (0, 0), and it 
may not even be inside the unit square. 
5 Analysis of I G A 
The following is our main result: 
Theorem 1 (Nash convergence of IGA in iterated 
general-sum games) If in a two-person, two-action, it­
erated general-sum game, both players follow the IGA 
algorithm, their average payoffs will converge in the 
limit to the expected payoffs for some Nash equilibrium. 
This will happen in one of two ways: 1) the strategy 
pair trajectory will itself converge to a Nash pair, or 
2) the strategy pair trajectory will not converge, but 
the average payoffs of the two players will nevertheless 
converge to the expected payoffs of some Nash pair. 
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The proof of this theorem is complex and involves con­
sideration of several special cases, and we present it in 
some detail below. But first we give some high-level in­
tuition as to why the theorem is correct. First observe 
that if the strategy pair trajectory ever converges, it 
must be that it has reached a point with zero gradi­
ent (or zero projected gradient if the point is on the 
boundary of the unit square). It turns out that all such 
points must be Nash pairs because no improvement is 
possible for either player. More remarkably, it turns 
out that the average payoff of each ellipse in Figure la 
is exactly the expected payoff of the center (which is a 
point with zero gradient). But how is all this affected 
by the constraints of the unit square? Imagine taking 
a unit square and placing it anywhere in the plane of 
Figure la. The projected gradient along the boundary 
will be determined by which quadrant the boundary 
is in. We show that if there are some ellipses con­
tained entirely in the unit square, the dynamics will 
converge to one such ellipse, and that if no ellipses 
are contained in the unit square (the center is out­
side the unit square), then the constrained dynamics 
must converge to a point. In either case, by the ar­
guments above, the average payoff will become Nash. 
Similarly, imagine taking a unit square and placing it 
anywhere on the plane in Figure lb. Given the gra­
dient direction in each quadrant of the plane we show 
that the dynamics will converge to some corner of the 
unit square. Again, the average payoff will become 
Nash. 
From dynamical systems (Reinhard, 1987) it can be 
shown that we only need to consider three mutually 
exclusive and exhaustive cases to complete a proof: 
1. U is not invertible. This will happen whenever u 
or u' or both are zero. Such a case can occur in 
team, zero-sum, and general-sum games. Exam­
ples of the dynamics in such a case are shown in 
Figure 2. 
2. U is invertible and its eigenvalues are purely imag­
inary. We can compute the eigenvalues by solving 
for A in the following equation: 
yielding .A2 = uu'. Therefore we will get imagi­
nary eigenvalues whenever uu' < 0. Such a case 
can occur in zero-sum and general-sum games but 
cannot happen in team games (because u = u' 
and therefore uu' 2: 0). Two examples of the dy­
namics are shown in Figure 4. 
3. U is invertible and its eigenvalues are purely real. 
This will happen whenever uu' > 0. Such a 
case can occur in team and general-sum games 
but cannot happen in zero-sum games (because 
u = -u' and therefore uu' :::; 0). Example dy­
namics are shown in Figure 6. 
Theorem 1 is proved below by showing that Nash con­
vergence holds in all three cases summarized above. 
But before we analyze these three cases in sequence 
in the next three subsections, we present a basic re­
sult common to all three cases that shows that if the 
(a(t), ,B(t)) trajectory ever converges to a point, then 
that point must be a Nash pair. 
Lemma 2 (Convergence of strategy pair implies con­
vergence to Nash equilibrium) If, in following IGA, 
limt--+00(a(t),,B(t)) = (ac,J3c), then (ac,J3c) is a Nash 
pair. In other words, if the strategy pair trajectory 
converges at all, it converges to a Nash pair. 
Proof: The strategy pair trajectory converges if and 
only if it reaches a point where the projected gradient 
is exactly zero. This can happen in two ways: 1) the 
point is the center (a*, ,8*), where by definition the 
gradient is zero (this can only happen if the center is 
in the unit square), or 2) the point is on the bound­
ary and the projected gradient is zero. Either way, it 
means that from that point no local improvement is 
possible. For a proof by contradiction, assume that 
such a point is not a Nash pair. Then for at least 
one of the players, say the column player, there must 
be a unilateral change that increases their payoff. Let 
the improved point be (ac,,Bi)· Then for all E > 0, 
(ac, (1 - t:),Bc + t:,Bi) must also be an improvement. 
This follows from the linear dependence of Vc(a, ,B) 
on (3 and the fact that the unit square is a convex re­
gion. Therefore the projected gradient at ac, J3c must 
be non-zero. D 
Corollary 3 If the center ( a•, ,8*) is in the unit 
square it is a Nash pair. 
5.1 U is not Invertible 
Lemma 4 (Nash convergence when U is not invert­
ible} When the matrix U is not invertible, the IGA 
algorithm leads the strategy pair trajectory to converge 
to a point on the boundary that is a Nash pair. 
Proof: First consider the case when exactly one of u 
and u' is zero. Without loss of generality assume that 
u = 0, i.e., (r11 +r22) = (r21 +r12). Then the gradient 
for the row player is constant (see Equation 3) and de­
pending on its sign, the row player will converge to ei­
ther a = 0 or to a = 1. Once the row player's strategy 
has converged, the gradient of the column player will 
also become constant (see Equation 4) and therefore 
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it too will converge to an extreme value and therefore 
the joint strategy will converge to some corner. If both 
u and u' are zero, then both the gradients are constant 
and again we get convergence to a corner of the unit 
square. 
In summary, if U is not invertible the gradient algo­
rithm will lead to convergence to some point on the 
boundary of the unit square, and hence from Lemma 2 
will lead to convergence to a Nash pair of the game. 
D 
a) b) 
! 
. 
Figure 2: Example dynamics with U not invertible. a) In 
this case u is zero and u' is not. b) Both u and u' are zero. 
Figure 2 shows the dynamics for two general-sum 
games in which U is not invertible. Figure 2a is for 
a case where u = 0 and u' > 0. The gradient for 
the row player is constant and points downwards. The 
gradient for the column player depends on a, but once 
a converges to zero it point to the right and therefore 
from all starting points we get convergence to the bot­
tom right corner. Figure 2b is for a case where both 
u and u' are zero. In this case both the gradients are 
constant and we get piecewise straight line dynamics. 
5.2 U has Purely Imaginary Eigenvalues 
Purely imaginary eigenvalues occur when uu' < 0 
in which case the two eigenvalues are �i and 
-�i. It can be shown that in such a case the 
unconstrained dynamics are elliptical around axes de­
termined by the eigenvectors of U (Reinhard, 1987). 
See Figure 3a) for an illustration. There are two pos­
sible cases to consider: 1) u > 0 and u' < 0, and 2) 
u < 0 and u' > 0. However, without loss of general­
ity we can consider only one case. When u < 0 and 
u' > 0, 
is a complex eigenvector corresponding to the eigen­
value �i, and 
is a complex eigenvector corresponding to the eigen­
value -�i. The axes of the ellipses in Figure 3a 
are determined by the real and imaginary parts of the 
two eigenvectors, that is, by the vectors 
Note that these two vectors, and hence the axes of 
the ellipses, are always orthogonal to each other and 
parallel to the axes of the unit square. In the zero­
sum case, because lui = iu' I, they are also equal in 
size which means that the dynamics in the zero-sum 
case are circular (we merely observe this but do not 
use it hereafter). Note that the ellipses are centered 
at (a*, ;3*) and that the unit square may be anywhere 
in JR2 and therefore the center can be outside the unit 
square . 
a) b) 
Figure 3: a) Unconstrained dynamics when U has imagi­
nary eigenvalues. b) The constrained dynamics when the 
center is in the unit square. In each case only some sample 
trajectories are shown. 
We can solve the affine differential Equation 6 for the 
unconstrained dynamics of a and j3 to get: 
a(t) = Bvu cos(..rv;;;t +¢)+a* (8) 
and 
(9) 
where B and ¢ are constants dependent on the ini­
tial a and ;3. These are the equations for the ellipses 
of Figure 3a. Note that if an ellipse happens to lie 
entirely inside the unit square then these equations 
also describe the constrained dynamics for any start­
ing strategy pair that falls on that ellipse. 
Lemma 5 (Nash Average Payoff for Ellipse entirely 
inside unit square) For any initial strategy pair 
( ao, J3o), if the trajectory given by Equations 8 and 9 
lies entirely within the unit square, then the average 
payoffs along that trajectory are exactly the expected 
payoffs of a Nash pair. 
Proof: Under the assumption that the ellipse lies en­
tirely in the unit square, the average payoff for the 
row player can be computed by integrating the value 
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obtained by the row-player in Equation 1 where the 
a and (3 trajectories are those specified in equations 8 
and 9. It can be shown that the integral of just the 
cosine term, just the sine term, and the product of 
the cosine and sine terms is exactly zero. This leaves 
just the terms containing a* and (3*. Therefore, the 
average payoffs are exactly the expected payoffs of the 
center which by Corollary 3 is a Nash pair. 0 
Therefore when the center point of the ellipses is in 
the interior of the unit square, then all ellipses around 
it that lie entirely within the unit square have Nash 
payoffs. 
Finally, we are ready to prove that when U has imagi­
nary eigenvalues, the average payoffs of the two players 
are always that of some Nash pair. 
Lemma 6 {Nash Convergence in the case of imagi­
nary eigenvalues) When the matrix U has imaginary 
eigenvalues, the IGA algorithm either leads the strat­
egy pairs to converge to a point on the boundary that is 
a Nash pair, or else the strategy pairs do not converge, 
but the average payoff of each player converges in the 
limit to that of some Nash pair. 
Proof: Consider again the unconstrained dynamics 
of Figure 3a. The four quadrants have the following 
general properties: in quadrant A the gradient has a 
positive component in the down and right directions, 
in quadrant B the gradient has a positive component 
in the down and left directions, in quadrant C the 
gradient has a positive component in the up and left 
directions, and in quadrant D the gradient has a posi­
tive component in the up and right directions. The di­
rection of the gradient on the boundaries between the 
quadrants is also shown in Figure 3a. The important 
observation here is that the direction of the gradient 
in each quadrant is such that there is a clockwise cycle 
through the quadrants. 
There are three possible cases to consider depending 
on the location of the center (a*, (3*). 
1. Center is in the interior of the unit square. 
First observe that all boundaries are tangent to 
some ellipse, and that at least one boundary is 
tangent to an ellipse that lies entirely within the 
unit square. For example, in Figure 3b the tan­
gent ellipse to the left-side boundary lies wholly 
inside the unit square, while the other three 
boundarys' tangent ellipses are not contained in 
the unit square. 
If the initial strategy pair coincides with the cen­
ter, we will get immediate convergence to a Nash 
equilibrium because the gradient there is zero. If 
the initial strategy pair is off the center point, 
then one of two things can happen: 1) either the 
ellipse that passes through the initial point does 
not intersect with the boundary, or 2) the ellipse 
that passes through the initial point intersects 
with a boundary. In the first case the dynam­
ics will just follow the ellipse, and by Lemma 5 
above, the average payoff for both players will be 
Nash, even though the strategy pairs themselves 
will not converge, but will follow the ellipse for­
ever. In Figure 3b this will happen if the initial 
strategy pair is inside or on the dashed ellipse. 
In case 2) above, the strategy pair trajectory will 
hit a boundary, and then travel along it until it 
reaches a point at which the boundary is tangent 
to some ellipse that may or may not lie entirely 
in the unit square. If it does, then the trajec­
tory will follow that ellipse thereafter. If it does 
not, then the trajectory will follow the tangent 
ellipse to the next boundary in the clockwise di­
rection. This process will repeat until the bound­
ary that has a tangent ellipse lying entirely within 
the unit square is reached. In Figure 3b, if the 
initial strategy pair starts anywhere outside the 
dashed ellipse, the dynamics will eventually follow 
the dashed ellipse. In all cases, from Lemma 5 we 
will get asymptotic convergence to the expected 
payoffs of some Nash pair. 
2. Center is on the Boundary. Consider the case 
where the center is on the left-side boundary of 
the unit square. The first observation is that all 
points below the center on the left-side boundary 
will then have a projected gradient of zero. (Fig­
ure 3a shows that the gradient at such points will 
point left, and therefore outside the unit square 
and perpendicular to the left-side boundary.) The 
bottom boundary will have a projected gradient 
to the left. No matter where we start, we will ei­
ther hit the bottom boundary, in which case we 
will get convergence to the lower left corner of 
the unit square, or we will hit the left bound­
ary below the center, in which case again we will 
converge because of the zero projected gradient 
there. In either case, from Lemma 2 such points 
will be Nash pairs. By symmetry, a similar argu­
ment is easily constructed when the center is on 
some other boundary of the unit square. 
3. Center outside unit square. There are two 
cases to consider: 1) the unit square lies en­
tirely inside one quadrant, and 2) the unit square 
lies entirely inside two adjacent quadrants. No 
other case is possible. First consider the situation 
when the unit square lies entirely within quad­
rant A. Then the gradient at each point points 
down and right (see Figure 3a), and hence we 
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will get convergence to the bottom right corner 
of the unit square. A similar argument is eas­
ily constructed when the unit square lies entirely 
within some other quadrant (yielding convergence 
to some other corner of the unit square). 
Next consider the case where the unit square lies 
in quadrants A and D. In quadrant D the gra­
dient points right and up, so either the trajec­
tory will enter quadrant A without hitting the 
top boundary, or it will hit the top boundary, 
in which case the projected gradient will be to­
wards the right, and again it will enter quadrant 
A. In quadrant A we will converge to the lower 
right corner of the unit square as above. A simi­
lar argument is easily constructed when the unit 
square lies within some other two adjacent quad­
rants (again yielding convergence to some corner 
of the unit square). 
a) b) 
Nash 
0 
Figure 4: Example dynamics when U has imaginary eigen­
values. a) The center is in the unit square. b) The center 
is on the left boundary of the unit square. 
In Figure 4 we present examples of strategy pair tra­
jectories for example problems whose U matrices have 
imaginary eigenvalues. The left-hand figure is for a 
case where the center is contained in the unit square 
while the right-hand figure is for a case where the cen­
ter is on the left-hand boundary of the unit square. 
5.3 U has Real Eigenvalues 
Figure 5: a) General characteristics of the unconstrained 
dynamics when U has real eigenvalues. b) The possible 
transitions between the quadrants of the left-hand figure. 
The unconstrained dynamics of a linear differential 
system with real eigenvalues are known to be diver-
gent (Reinhard, 1987). See Figure 1 b) for an illus­
tration. Thus, without the constraints of the unit 
square, the strategy pair trajectory would diverge. 
Figure 5a shows the crucial general properties of the 
unconstrained dynamics. The center (a*, /3*) is the 
point where the gradient is zero. Everywhere in quad­
rant A the gradient has a positive component in the 
right direction and in the up direction; in quadrant 
B the gradient has a positive component in the up 
direction and in the left direction; in quadrant C the 
gradient has a positive component in the left and down 
directions; and in quadrant D the gradient has a pos­
itive component in the right and down directions. At 
the boundary between quadrants A and D the gradi­
ent points left; at the boundary between A and B it 
points up; at the boundary between B and C it points 
to the right; and at the boundary between C and D is 
points down. The unit square that defines the feasible 
range of strategy pairs can be anywhere relative to the 
center. The eigenvectors corresponding to the two real 
eigenvalues, VUUt and -VUUt are 
respectively (this is for the case that u, u' > 0; the 
analysis for the case that u, u' < 0 is analogous and 
omitted). The eigenvectors are represented in Fig­
ure 5a with dashed lines: one by drawing a line 
through the center and the point (1, jYI) and and 
the other by drawing a line through the center and 
the point (1, -jYI). Note that the general qualita­
tive characteristics of the positive components of the 
gradient in the different quadrants do not depend on 
the eigenvectors. However, the eigenvectors are rele­
vant to the detailed dynamics, as we will see in the 
examples below. 
Lemma 7 (Nash convergence in the case of real 
eigenvalues) For the case of U having real eigenvalues, 
the IGA algorithm leads the strategy pair trajectory to 
converge to a point on the boundary that is a Nash 
pair. 
Proof: Consider the graph of possible transitions be­
tween the quadrants in Figure 5b. From every point 
inside quadrant A, the gradient is such that the strat­
egy pair will never leave that quadrant. Therefore if 
the strategy pair trajectory ever enters quadrant A, it 
will converge to the top right corner of the unit square. 
Similarly, from every point inside quadrant C, the gra­
dient is such that the strategy pair will never leave that 
quadrant. Thus if the strategy pair trajectory ever en­
ters quadrant C, it will converge to the lower left cor­
ner of the unit square. If the initial strategy pair is in 
quadrant B or D, the dynamics is a bit more complex 
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because it depends on the location of the unit square 
relative to the center. We consider only the case of 
quadrant D, for by symmetry a similar analysis will 
hold for quadrant B. Unless the unit square lies en­
tirely in quadrant D, the strategy pair trajectory will 
enter quadrant C or quadrant A, in which case we will 
get convergence to the associated corner as above. If 
the unit square is entirely within quadrant D, then 
the direction of the gradient in that quadrant will lead 
to convergence to the lower right corner of the unit 
square. Finally, if the right-hand boundary of the unit 
square is on the boundary between quadrants D and 
A, then all the points on that boundary will have zero 
projected gradient, and any trajectory from D hitting 
that boundary will converge there. Similarly, if the 
bottom boundary of the unit square is aligned with 
the boundary between quadrants C and D, then any 
trajectory from D hitting that boundary will converge 
there. From Lemma 2, if we ever get convergence to a 
strategy pair, it must be a Nash pair. 0 
a) b) 
Figure 6: Example dynamics when U has real eigenval­
ues. a) Center in the unit square. b) Center on the right 
boundary of the unit square. 
In Figure 6 we present examples of strategy pair tra­
jectories for example problems whose U matrices have 
real eigenvalues. The left-hand figure has the center in 
the unit square; the right-hand figure has the center 
on the right-hand boundary of the unit square. The 
locations of the Nash points are shown. 
6 Finite Decreasing Step Size 
The above analysis and Theorem 1 have been about 
the IGA algorithm that assumes that both players 
are following the true gradient with infinitesimal step 
sizes. In practice, of course, the two players would 
use the gradient ascent algorithm of Equation 5 with 
a decreasing finite step size 'f/k (where k is the iteration 
number). 
Theorem 8 The sequence of strategy pairs produced 
by both players following the gradient ascent algo­
rithm of Equation 5 with a decreasing step size (several 
schedules will work, e.g., 'f}k = k}13) will satisfy one of 
the following two properties: 1) it will converge to a 
Nash pair, or 2) the strategy pair sequence will not 
converge, but the average payoff will converge in the 
limit to that of some Nash pair. 
Proof: (Sketch) Here we provide some intuition; the 
full proof is deferred to the full paper. Consider first 
the cases in which the IGA algorithm converges to a 
Nash pair. The proofs in such cases exploited only the 
direction of the gradient in the four quadrants around 
the center. These same proofs will extend without 
modification to the case of decreasing step sizes. The 
one case (with imaginary eigenvalues) in which the 
IGA algorithm does not converge to a point but in­
stead converges to some ellipse fully contained in the 
unit square is more complex to handle. The basic in­
tuition is that the strategy pairs cannot get "trapped" 
anywhere, and as the step size decreases, the dynamics 
of gradient ascent approaches the dynamics of IGA. 0 
7 Conclusion 
Algorithms based on gradient ascent in expected pay­
off are natural candidates for adapting strategies in 
repeated games. In this work we analyzed the per­
formance of such algorithms in the base case of two­
person, two-action, iterated general-sum games, and 
showed that even though the strategies of the two play­
ers may not converge, the asymptotic average payoff 
of the two players always converges to the expected 
payoff of some Nash equilibrium. Our proof also pro­
vides some insight into special classes of games, such 
as zero-sum and team games. 
In the future we will study the behavior of gradient 
ascent algorithms in complex multi-action and contin­
uous action games in which the players use parameter­
ized representations of strategies. 
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